Identifying Terrorists: Privacy Rights in the United States and the United Kingdom by Luk, Joyce W.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 25
Number 2 Spring 2002 Article 5
1-1-2002
Identifying Terrorists: Privacy Rights in the United
States and the United Kingdom
Joyce W. Luk
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joyce W. Luk, Identifying Terrorists: Privacy Rights in the United States and the United Kingdom, 25 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 223
(2002).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol25/iss2/5
Identifying Terrorists: Privacy Rights in
the United States and the United
Kingdom
BY JOYCE W. LUK*
Introduction
While the privacy concerns raised by technological advances are
widely recognized, recent terrorist attacks and developments in
surveillance and information technologies have led to a convergence
of technologies that in many situations present a new challenge to the
right to privacy.
A. Big Brother Is Watching
Recently, in light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in
New York and Washington, D.C., the government implemented
heightened security measures in airports, on bridges, and in federal
buildings. In Fresno, California, these security measures included, for
the first time in a United States airport, use of facial recognition
technology to scan faces for terrorists as passengers entered security
checkpoints.!
Earlier in 2001, police video cameras focused on the faces of
Super Bowl fans as they streamed through the turnstiles at Raymond
James Stadium in Tampa, Florida.2  Cables instantly carried the
images to computers in the control room. In less than a second they
were compared with thousands of digital images of known criminals
and suspected terrorists Fans never knew they were being watched.'
* J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002.
1. Jim Steinberg, McDonald's Adds New Touch in Fresno, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 4,
2002, at Cl.
2. Peter Slevin, Police Video Cameras Taped Football Fans; Super Bowl
Surveillance Stirs Debate, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al.
3. Id.
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Today, everyone appears to be watching everyone else. Police
cameras capture speeding motorists at busy intersections, casinos use
facial recognition technology to identify undesirable patrons, and in
the gritty East London borough of Newham, British police installed
300 cameras employing facial recognition technology to survey the
town center for criminals.5
B. Expansion of Surveillance Technology Outpaces Fourth
Amendment Protections
In the United States, law enforcement, one of the fastest areas of
expansion in the federal government,6 is adopting military
surveillance technologies Additionally, law enforcement agencies
have taken advantage of numerous advancements in civilian
surveillance technologies, such as facial recognition technology.
Current U.S. law is ill-prepared to deal with the challenges
presented by new surveillance technologies. Currently, federal law
places controls over the installation of electronic aural bugging
devices in private dwellings, but no equivalent statutes address the
similar placement of video surveillance devices.8 This is particularly
significant because after the September 11 attacks, the trend of using
surveillance technologies is likely to increase even more rapidly.
C. Thesis
If properly regulated, the use of video surveillance and facial
recognition technologies for law enforcement can be effective in
ensuring the safety of citizens while at the same time maintaining an
individual's right to privacy. These types of surveillance technologies,
when used for proper purposes, are relatively non-invasive and will
not inordinately intrude on individual privacy. The use of video
4. Id. In an interview on CNN Talkback Live, Joe Durkin, a spokesman for the
Tampa Police Department, asserted that there were posted warnings throughout the
exterior of the football stadium indicating the presence of closed-circuit television
surveillance. Furthermore, the cameras were apparently in plain view, thus, the
videotaping was not entirely secret. CNN Talkback Live: Should People Who Are
Criminals Be Under Surveillance? (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 1, 2001)
(transcript no. 01020100V14).
5. Slevin, supra note 2.
6. Peter Andreas, The Rise of the American Crimefare State, WORLD POL'Y J.,
Oct. 11, 1997, at 37.
7. Id. at 41.
8. William C. Rempel, Computer Age Gaps; Privacy Law: Race to Pace
Technology, L.A. TIMES, May 14,1985, at Al.
[Vol. 25:223
Privacy Rights in the United States and the United Kingdom
surveillance and facial recognition technology is justified for the
purposes of decreasing crime and preventing further terrorist attacks.
However, there should be specific legal protections regulating the
proliferation of these new technologies before the technology gets
beyond our control.
Currently, under U.S. law, it is unlikely that the use of video
surveillance for law enforcement purposes is illegal or
unconstitutional per se, even when used in conjunction with facial
recognition and information technology. However, this use of
technology presents several constitutional issues, particularly the
chilling of personal autonomy and the individual's First Amendment
right to freedom of speech and association.
In addition to the constitutional issues, there are social and
ethical issues that merit consideration. The discourse asks whether
people are willing to live their lives under the watchful lens of a video
camera, and if so, to what extent they are willing to sacrifice personal
autonomy and risk governmental abuse of this data.
Lawmakers should not be deterred from incorporating this new
technology to ensure the safety and well-being of its citizens. At the
same time, however, unless Congress modifies the law to address the
issues raised by new technologies, the public's right to privacy will be
severely diminished.
D. Structure of this Note
Parts I and II give a general background on video surveillance
and facial recognition software and discuss the technology behind,
and uses of, closed circuit television (CCTV) in the United States and
elsewhere. These two sections discuss the emerging technologies
driving facial recognition applications, their use in conjunction with
video surveillance, and the development of other surveillance
technologies such as biometric identification and scanning devices.9
Part III explores the meaning of privacy, privacy rights, and their
applicability to facial recognition technology, video surveillance, and
other emerging surveillance technologies in the United States. This
section also analyzes the legal and statutory development of privacy
rights and explores whether video surveillance incorporating facial
recognition technology is incompatible with judicial and legislative
9. Video surveillance is normally conducted through CCTV systems. A CCTV
system can be as simple as a single camera, monitor and a recorder.
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history.
Part IV discusses privacy rights and statutory regulations in the
United Kingdom dealing with new surveillance technology.
Part V is a comparative analysis of the privacy protections of the
United Kingdom and the United States and includes a proposal
implementing some of the United Kingdom's privacy protections in
the United States.
Finally, Part VI concludes that proper regulation would allow
facial recognition software and video surveillance to be used in ways
that help society, without violating personal autonomy and a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy. It is unlikely, however, that the
United States will implement any proactive legislation to handle the
privacy problems created by emerging technologies.
1. Video Surveillance
A. Current State of Video Surveillance
Video surveillance technology and CCTV systems were first
introduced in 1956.1" Thanks to numerous technological advances in
recent years, it has evolved to include digitization and
miniaturization.
The digitization of images allows for the easy and inexpensive
reproduction and transferability of video images." It also allows the
digital data representing these images to be stored easily for an
indefinite period of time."
In recent years, miniaturization has diminished the cost and size
of video surveillance equipment, allowing law enforcement and
private consumers increasingly to utilize and/or replace old
equipment with the newer more clandestine and unobtrusive
technology.'3 For example, pinhole video cameras are now available
that fit in the palm of one's hand and can be hidden almost anywhere,
even on a watch face. 4 When used in conjunction with remote
identification systems, these cameras can return identification
10. Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You're On Candid Camera: Privacy and
Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1997).
11. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 16 (1997).
12. Id.
13. Mark Boal, SpyCam City, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 6, 1998, at 38.
14. Burrows, supra note 10, at 1080.
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information to the surveillant wirelessly and in real time.5
1. United States
Over sixty urban centers in the United States use video
surveillance in public places for law enforcement purposes, such as
prevention of traffic violations.16 Tacoma, Washington, is believed to
be the first city in the country to announce publicly that they use
video surveillance for law enforcement purposes; Baltimore,
Maryland, has what is considered to be the most expansive video
surveillance system in the United States." Recently, Yosemite
International Airport implemented biometrics to scan faces for
terrorists as passengers enter security checkpoints."
Television broadcasters and viewers in the United States seem
captivated by the vicarious thrill of witnessing invasions of others'
privacy. "Real life" television programming uses video surveillance
and CCTV systems to create programs such as COPS and Rescue
911."9 Investigative news programs use hidden cameras, while local
network affiliates replay footage of criminal activity from police and
liquor store video cameras on their news broadcasts.0
There is a recent explosion of "reality-based" television
programs, which employ the concept of watching individuals'
everyday activities and unscripted interactions. Participants of these
shows-Real World, Survivor, and Temptation Island, for example-
clearly have no expectation of privacy.2' These shows reflect a trend
towards decreased expectations of privacy in the technological age.
Their popularity suggests that whatever the rationale, society
15. Digital Biometrics Ships Live-Scan Systems to Seven Major U.S. Airports -
Seattle, LAX, Denver, Dallas-Fort Worth, JFK, Newark and Chicago O'Hare, PR
NEWswiRE, Jan. 24,2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
16. Boal, supra note 13, at 38.
17. Mark Hansen, No Place to Hide, 83 A.B.A. J. 44,44-45 (1997).
18. Steinberg, supra note 1.
19. Burrows, supra note 10, at 1107.
20. Id. at 1108.
21. Reality television programming is popular on the various networks. For
example, the Real World (1992-present) is an MTV television series that chronicles
the lives of groups of young adults living together. Survivor (CBS 2000) made a big
splash over the summer as it followed the trials of a group of adults stranded on an
island. The last one left on the island receives one million dollars. Temptation Island
(Fox 2001) is based on the same concept as Survivor, except that it involves the
seduction of supposedly secure couples by a group of attractive singles in a tropical
paradise.
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currently has a desire to gaze and be gazed upon.
2. United Kingdom and Abroad
Video surveillance has long been a way of life for much of
Europe.' In the United Kingdom, CCTV and video surveillance is
commonplace. Currently, over seventy-five cities use it to monitor
urban centers, and approximately 95% of all local governments are
considering its use as a law enforcement tool.' Elsewhere, authorities
in France, Australia, Ireland, and Scotland use video surveillance in
public places as a law enforcement tool.'
Cities in Europe that have installed video surveillance cameras
claim dramatic reductions in crime rates.2 Newham, England, one of
the first cities to introduce CCTV systems in 1992, has spent more
than $30 million installing thousands of street corner surveillance
cameras. The city credits these cameras with causing a 13.4% drop in
regional crimes.' Research on Newham's crime statistics showed an
11% decline in assaults, a 49% drop in burglary, and a 44% drop in
criminal damage through the end of 1994 due to the implementation
of street surveillance.27
B. Uses of Video Surveillance
1. Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention
Law enforcement agencies use video surveillance both as a
method to identify criminals and as a tool for crime prevention.
These agencies also use clandestine video surveillance to build cases
against criminal suspects. Police use police-operated camera systems
(in those areas where they exist) and privately operated surveillance
systems to identify those who engage in criminal activity.'
22. Hansen, supra note 17, at 45.
23. Burrows, supra note 10, at 1099.
24. Id. at 1101-02.
25. Id. at 1123.
26. Janet Ward, Beyond the Big Brother Syndrome, AM. CITY & COUNTY, Oct.
1998, at S4, S6 (Supp.).
27. John Deane, CCTV Boost Follows Crime-Fighting Success, PRESS Ass'N
NEWSFILE, Oct. 13, 1995, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
28. David R. Baker, Security Cameras Have Eye on You; Lost Privacy Cost of
Safety, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 24, 1998, at N1. "So common are surveillance
cameras in stores that police routinely check their videotapes near crime scenes,
hoping the electronic eyes have spied something useful." Id.
[Vol. 25:223
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Police in a number of cities utilize video and camera surveillance
to prevent traffic violations and to catch violators29 In San Francisco
and Los Angeles, authorities positioned cameras at certain street
intersections to enforce stoplights by capturing license plate images."
Drivers who run a red light can expect to receive a citation in the
mail." Elsewhere, the same mechanism enables video and camera
surveillance to enforce speed limits.' In Scotland, for example) there
are an estimated 10,000 cameras monitoring traffic speed and parking
structures."
2. Other Uses
In addition to law enforcement, large companies and businesses
use video surveillance for a variety of other purposes. They use
hidden cameras to monitor employee productivity, deter theft and
fraud, and ensure safety in the workplace.' Retailers use video
surveillance in their loss-prevention programs, and fans of spy
literature or films are familiar with the ways in which video and
camera surveillance has been used for purposes of espionage.
Voyeurism also drives many applications of video surveillance
technology. Video from hidden cameras (e.g. toilet cams, gynocams,
and even dildocams!) commonly ends up on the Internet, often
depicting women caught unaware. 5
H. Facial Recognition Technology
Facial recognition technology is a relatively unobtrusive and non-
invasive system of biometric identification. A number of
corporations design software applications for this technology 6 The
29. See Burrows, supra note 10, at 1083. In Fairfax, Virginia, an intersection
surveillance system has been credited with causing a drop in red light violations.
Ward, supra note 26.
30. For example, the author has observed that in San Francisco, surveillance
cameras patrol large intersections, such as Sloat Boulevard and 19th Avenue. While
driving in Los Angeles, the author has observed surveillance cameras along La
Cienega Boulevard at three different intersections: Sunset Boulevard, Melrose
Avenue, and Wilshire Boulevard.
31. Burrows, supra note 10, at 1083 & n.42.
32. Id.
33. Alastair Dalton, Controls Urged on Big Brother's All-Seeing Eyes, SCOTSMAN,
July 23, 1998, at 9.
34. Boal, supra note 13, at 38.
35. Id.
36. Ken Phillips, Face Recognition Gears Up, P.C. WEEK, Oct. 27, 1997, at 108.
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software uses algorithms to recognize and then represent patterns and
relationships in human facial features,37 similar to the way the human
brain recognizes and remembers facial images." It can locate and
identify human faces from live video or static images, at angles of up
to thirty-five degrees, while compensating for lighting conditions, skin
color, eyeglasses, facial expressions, facial hair, and aging.39 The
software is capable of building a time stamped database of facial
images for storage, later analysis, and comparisons.' Facial
recognition technology may be used to search watch-lists, video
libraries of individual images (such as high school yearbooks, drivers'
licenses, or passport photographs) or law enforcement databases."
The software does not give 100% probability, rather it lists
probabilities based on how confident the system is of a correct
identification." The system will discard faces that do not match those
in the database.43 The limiting factor, therefore, in facial recognition
technology is the database. In order for the technology to be
effective, governmental databases, perhaps worldwide, would need to
be merged.
Authorities can use facial recognition technology in combination
with other biometric information, such as fingerprint or retinal
scanning.' Biometric data can also be correlated with an array of
personal information, such as an individual's medical history, tax
records, criminal arrest records, voting records, political affiliations,
and any other conceivable type of information." For example, facial
recognition technology recently helped Mexican election officials
prevent voter fraud.46
37. Find Criminals, Missing Children, Even Terrorists in a Crowd Using Face
Recognition Software Linked to a Database, Nov. 16, 1998, available at 1998 LEXIS




41. See, e.g., Steve Carney, Computer Puts Names to Faces of Criminals, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at B1.
42. Id.
43. Find Criminals, supra note 37.
44. John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the
Concerns - Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PiTr. L. REV. 97, 140 (1997).
45. See David A. Petti, An Argument for the Implementation of a Biometric
Authentication System ("BAS"), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 703, 728
(1998) (expressing concern that this information might be accessed for improper use).
46. Innovator Gives Computers Insight; Machines Able to Recognize Familiar
Users, THE RECORD, Jan. 10, 2001, at B3.
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A. Uses of Facial Recognition Technology
There are two main uses for facial recognition technology:
identification, and access control or authentication.47
1. Identification
Identification is the ability to identify one person among those
whose biometric identifying patterns have been recorded.' Law
enforcement agencies are able to use facial recognition software to
identify criminals or known terrorists by taking video surveillance
images and using facial recognition software to identify perpetrators."
Similarly, they can identify known criminals through active scanning
of facial images and simultaneous comparison to a database of
compiled facial images." Technology that can simultaneously scan
facial images and compare those images with others already entered
and indexed in a database gives officials the ability to immediately
identify known criminals and prevent future crime.1
2. Authentication
Authentication is the ability to verify a person's identity through
a comparison with their previously recorded biometric
measurements.52 Facial recognition technology is a useful tool to
control access and verify authorization in a number of different areas.
Government agencies such as the Department of Motor Vehicles use
it to verify vehicle ownership, while financial institutions use it before
providing account access. 3
For authorization purposes, facial recognition technology is the
least obtrusive or invasive of all the biometric technologies. It is
equally effective in allowing for quick scanning of large numbers of
persons from a safe distance and without the subjects' knowledge."
47. Woodward, supra note 44, at 100.
48. Id.
49. Carney, supra note 41, at Bi.
50. Id.
51. Richard Thomas, As UK Crime Outstrips US, a Hidden Eye Is Watching, THE
OBSERVER, Oct. 11, 1998, at 5.
52. Woodward, supra note 44, at 100.
53. Phillips, supra note 36, at 108.
54. Gayle Bryant, Big Brother Is Watching, and He Knows Your Face, Bus. REV.
WKLY., July 27, 1998, at 110.
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B. Other New Surveillance and Information Technologies
In the arena of biometric identification and scanning, the number
of technologies currently emerging is impressive. The old standard of
fingerprint identification has been improved, supplemented and
sometimes supplanted by new technologies using algorithms to
compare measurements of individuals' hand features.5 In fact, a
person's fingerprint can now be used instead of a credit card to make
purchases. 6 In addition, technology is also available for voice
recognition, signature recognition, hand vein mapping, iris
recognition, and retinal scans.57 The first iris-scan-protected ATM in
the nation was introduced in Texas in 1999."
The military uses new surveillance technologies such as Forward
Looking Infrared Device that detects infrared heat emissions, back-
scattered x-ray imaging (which digitally enhances a sketched outline
of an individual's body), passive millimeter wave imaging (which can
be used to see through an individual's clothing to detect weapons and
other items), and radar skin scanning (which is an even more accurate
way of scanning an individual's body and discerning weapons
carried).59
The field of information technology is evolving. For example,
data mining, also known as knowledge discovery in databases,'
compiles a simple recommendation list from gigabytes of structured
data, finding patterns that are impossible to anticipate. 6 Researchers,
however, have begun to move beyond the original focus on highly
structured, relational databases to the areas of text data mining and
video mining.62 Text data mining involves extracting unexpected
relationships from huge collections of free-form text.63 Video mining
uses a combination of speech recognition, image understanding, and
natural-language processing techniques to open up the world's vast
55. Woodward, supra note 44, at 104.
56. Steinberg, supra note 1.
57. Woodward, supra note 44, at 104.
58. Alexandra Stikeman, 10 Emerging Technologies That Will Change the World;
Technology Information, 104 TECH. REv. 97 (2001).
59. Hansen, supra note 17, at 44-45.
60. M. Mitchell Waldrop, 10 Emerging Technologies That Will Change the World;
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video archives to efficient computer searching.'
The results are still preliminary, but it is conceivable that data
mining, when used in conjunction with surveillance and facial
recognition technology, could have a powerful impact on privacy
rights.
I. The Right to Privacy in the United States
The high regard for privacy in the United States has always been
juxtaposed with "a desire to regulate moral life, a suspicion of
secrecy, [and] a democratic impulse to openness."'  Surveillance
technology raises privacy concerns perhaps more directly than other
types of technology because it is designed to enable a surveillant to
observe without obtaining consent from the subject. 6 Furthermore,
although privacy concerns stemming from surveillance activity
traditionally involve government intrusion, private actors increasingly
have access to surveillance equipment and the ability to invade an
individual's privacy.
A. History
In the seventeenth century, the concept of privacy in the
American colonies was undeveloped.67 Homes were often small and
cramped, making it difficult to maintain privacy." Further, in Puritan
New England, neighborly spying was seen as a civil obligation,
necessary for an orderly society.
During the eighteenth century as the United States became more
cosmopolitan, a gradual distinction between public and private began
to emerge.7" Residences were more spacious and had separate rooms
and walls.7' The Constitution protected those homes from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the quartering of troops.'
64. Id.
65. Miriam Horn, Shifting Lines of Privacy: Today's Anxieties Mirror Earlier
Debates in America's History, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 26, 1998, at 57.
66. Although surveillance techniques certainly can be used to observe a subject's
public activities, new technology can create difficulties in demarcating those activities
that are public and those that are private.





72. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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During the nineteenth century, journalistic invasions of the
privacy of public figures were commonplace.73 The advent of quick
photography and mass-circulation newspapers in the latter part of the
century gave rise to the United States' first "invasion of privacy"
lawsuits. 4  During the Cold War, the government stepped up
surveillance of individuals in the name of national security; essentially
private matters, such as sexual orientation and membership in
"subversive" political organizations, became the basis for accusations
of treason. 5 Ironically, while suburbia and the automobile increased
personal autonomy, Cold War tensions made it increasingly necessary
to find out what one's neighbors were doing.76
Today, battles over privacy reflect historical conflicts.77 There is
always tension between the individual's need for privacy and
autonomy, and the sense that society suffers when morality goes
unregulated.78 Of course, society is also thought to suffer from
excessive public exposure of private impulses.79 Television and the
video camera erase the lines between the public and private, allowing
private lives to be put on public display.'
B. Interests in Privacy
Privacy is an essential element of a free society. Without the
ability to interact with one another in private, individuals cannot
exchange ideas freely. This "marketplace of ideas" is essential for a
democracy to function properly, and gives rise to a free society."
Although no "universally accepted definition of the right to privacy"'
exists, court opinions that address privacy issues often encompass
three types of privacy interests: autonomy, intrusion, and information
privacy.'
73. Horn, supra note 65, at 57.
74. Id.






81. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority's intent test and applying the "clear and present
danger" test to defendant's speech).
82. Sheri A. Alpert, Privacy and Intelligent Highways: Finding the Right of Way,
11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 97,102 (1995).
83. Id. at 104 (citing GEORGE B. TRUBOW, PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE (1991)).
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Autonomy is the ability of an individual to engage in private
activities free from intervention or regulation." Autonomy allows
people to make decisions freely and act as individuals.'
Privacy also includes an interest against intrusion. It "means
being free from surveillance in situations in which an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. ' 6 The argument against intrusion
is tied to the anonymity of individuals.' Anonymity in this context
does not signify a complete lack of ability to identify someone; rather,
it refers to an individual's ability to go about his or her daily life
without someone watching every move. Surveillance technology is
designed to intrude upon this anonymity and, in certain situations,
society accepts this intrusion. It is unclear what types of intrusion and
to what extent intrusion is acceptable when new advances in
surveillance are involved.
The third aspect of privacy is information or data privacy.
Information privacy is also tied to the concept of anonymity. Instead
of addressing an individual's actions and movements, it is concerned
with the individual's personal information. Individual bits of personal
information can identify a person and his or her activities. When
various items of personal information are pieced together, an even
more telling picture can develop!' The argument for information
privacy stems from the concern that individuals have a right to some
control over who has access to their personal information and for
what purpose.'
New technology can encroach upon all three privacy interests.
Intrusion and information privacy interests, however, are particularly
affected by the technologies and their merger as discussed here.
As Sheri Alpert points out, these three interests in privacy are "by no means
mutually exclusive." Id. For the benefit of discussion of the right of privacy,
however, it is helpful to separate them into distinct categories.
84. Id. at 104.
85. Although an autonomy interest is important to the concept of privacy, neither
surveillance technology nor personal information problems disturb the autonomy
aspect of privacy.
86. Alpert, supra note 82, at 105.
87. Id.
88. Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information Age
Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police Technology?, 34 JURIMETRICS J.
383,400 n.89 (1994).
89. This concern arises out of anonymity concerns in the same way as the interest
against intrusion does. Information privacy concerns differ from intrusion concerns,
however, in that they address an individual's personal information, rather than the
individual himself.
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C. Surveillance Intrusion, Wiretapping, and the Fourth Amendment
There is no specific constitutional right to privacy. The Supreme
Court, however, developed a limited right of privacy based on a
jurisprudence of "fundamental rights" in a string of cases-Griswold
v. Connecticut,90 Roe v. Wade,9 Whalen v. Roe,' and Bowers v.
Hardwick.9' The Supreme Court has described this right as a
"penumbral right," flowing from the emanations of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 4 It generally has
been limited to certain rights of privacy and autonomy in individuals'
intimate life decisions, such as whether to have children or to engage
in consensual sexual intercourse while married.95
1. Search Warrants
Surveillance activity directly relates to an individual's interest
against intrusion because it is an intentional attempt to observe that
which the individual believes to be private. The discussion of the
relationship between surveillance activity and privacy concerns begins
with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.96  An
unconstitutional search is an unreasonable intrusion on an
individual's privacy rights.7 The placement of surveillance devices on
a subject's private property by law enforcement agencies requires a
search warrant issued by a court.98 For example, courts generally
express a willingness to approve both audio and video surveillance,
provided that the type of crime necessitates it and the surveillance
does not involve the observance of purely private activities. New
developments in surveillance technology, however, can further
90. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
91. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
93. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
94. Burrows, supra note 10, at 1090-91; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
95. Burrows, supra note 10, at 1091-2003. "In Griswold v. Connecticut, the court
changed the field of privacy... sparking a new type of privacy that resulted from a
combination of technological advances in birth control and the personal choice to
exercise privacy rights in this area." Id. at 1091.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It is the search aspect of the Fourth Amendment to
which surveillance activity relates.
97. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion").
98. See Chip Johnson, Techno-Cops: Police Tools of the '90s are Highly
Advanced, but Privacy Laws Lag, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1990, at Al.
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complicate the question of what constitutes such a search." Courts
have not yet been presented with the question of the use of facial
recognition technology in connection with video surveillance.
In early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
used the trespass doctrine to determine whether governmental
activities amounted to an unconstitutional search."° The Court used
what was termed an "area-based" approach and narrowly construed
the Fourth Amendment. 1 It held that a search did not occur unless
physical intrusion into one of the subject's "constitutionally protected
areas" occurred.1" Surveillance such as wiretapping, which did not
require physical intrusion, did not constitute a search, and thus, did
not require a warrant. 3
In 1967, the Supreme Court replaced the trespass doctrine with
the Katz doctrine. In Katz v. United States, the Court found that a
telephone wiretap constituted a search." The decision extended
Fourth Amendment protection by reasoning that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."'0 5 The Court in Katz found
that surveillance technology could violate an individual's interest
against intrusion even without any physical trespass.
0 6
The Katz doctrine has been used to determine whether a search
has occurred. The test from Katz, as articulated in Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion, consists of two prongs that examine subjective
and objective factors. 07 Under the first prong of the test, the subject
99. See Elizabeth Fernandez, State Prisons Scanning Visitors with X-Rays, S.F.
EXAMINER, Nov. 3,1997, at Al.
100. The Court established the trespass doctrine in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (holding that a wiretap did not constitute an illegal search
because no physical intrusion of the defendant's "houses, persons, papers, and
effects" occurred).
101. Randolph S. Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer
Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REv. 1181, 1187 (1995).
102. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961) (holding that
eavesdropping surveillance constituted an illegal search because the microphone
physically intruded into the premises).
103. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
104. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
105. Id. at 351.
106. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that Fourth Amendment
protections extend beyond physical invasion, because "in the present day...
reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical
invasion").
107. Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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must "have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy..'. 8
The second prong then assesses whether that "expectation [is] one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.""'  For activity,
including surveillance, to constitute a search under Katz, both prongs
of the test must be met. The Katz test as applied by many courts,
however, does not provide sufficient protection against numerous
emerging technologies.
Federal courts apply the standards handed down by the Supreme
Court in audio surveillance cases when reviewing the legitimacy of
video surveillance orders."0 In United States v. Torres, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the use of video surveillance, balancing the necessity
of the surveillance against the level of intrusion (i.e. the type of crime
involved weighed against the premises where the video surveillance
was used)."' The government obtained an order allowing the
placement of video surveillance in a "safe house" of an organization
suspected of terrorist activities."' The court concluded that the order
allowing the video surveillance was proper because private activities
were not involved and the activities were of an illegal nature."' The
court explained, however, that video surveillance represents an
extremely intrusive form of technology and the constitutional
standard for issuing a warrant should be high."' The court borrowed
108. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. See United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 880-81 (7th Cir. 1984). To date,
federal appellate courts have decided only three cases involving video surveillance.
See id. at 875; United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987).
111. 751 F.2d at 882. The court did state that "television surveillance is
exceedingly intrusive.., and inherently indiscriminate, and... could be grossly
abused - to eliminate personal privacy as understood in modem Western nations."
Id.
112. Id. at 877. The defendants were members of Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion
Nacional Puertorriquena (FALN), a group that wanted the territory of Puerto Rico
to separate from the United States. Id. at 876. The FALN was responsible for a
number of bombings in New York, Chicago, and Washington D.C. Id. Using video
surveillance, the government watched as some of the defendants assembled the
bombs. Id. at 877.
113. Id. at 883. "[T]he invasion of privacy caused by secretly televising the interior
of business premises is less than that caused by secretly televising the interior of a
home, while the social benefit of the invasion is greater when the organization under
investigation runs a bomb factory than it would be if it ran a chop shop or a numbers
parlor." Id.
114. Id. at 883-84. The court noted that even video surveillance conducted
pursuant to a warrant could be held unconstitutional if the intrusiveness of the search
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provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968... (Title III) that implemented the Fourth Amendment's
requirements of particularity in warrants."6
In United States v. Biasucci, the Second Circuit also followed
Title III as a guide to Fourth Amendment analysis."7  The
government charged the defendants with violating the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act."' During the
government's investigation, the court granted an order authorizing
video surveillance inside the defendants' place of business. 9
"Finding the reasoning of Torres to be compelling," the court held
"district courts, federal magistrates, and state judges may authorize
television surveillance of private premises in appropriate
circumstances."'" However, the court failed to explain why video
surveillance was necessary under the circumstances.'
United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez is a more recent federal
appellate decision involving video surveillance.l" In Cuevas-Sanchez,
the government obtained a warrant allowing video surveillance of the
exterior of an alleged drug dealer's home." The government placed
exceeded the necessity of using video surveillance. Id. at 883.
115. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994). The Act governs audio surveillance, but does
not address video surveillance.
116. Torres, 751 F.2d at 885. The Title III provisions were the particularity of the
search, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(1994), the necessity of using video surveillance, 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1994), and the time period in which the surveillance is to occur,
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d) (1994).
117. United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1986). The court
chose to apply specific provisions of Title III that it deemed "codifications of the
amendment's requirements." Cheryl Spinner, Let's Go to the Videotape: The Second
Circuit Sanctions Covert Video Surveillance of Domestic Criminals, 53 BROOK. L.
REV. 469,474 (1987).
118. Biasucci, 786 F.2d at 506; see Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). The defendants were appealing the trial court's
decision to admit videotapes recorded by surreptitious surveillance that had been
installed pursuant to a warrant issued by a district court. Biasucci, 786 F.2d at 506.
119. Biasucci, 786 F.2d at 507.
120. Id. at 509.
121. Denise Troy, Comment, Video Surveillance Big Brother May Be Watching
You, 21 ARIz. ST. L. J. 445, 453 (1989) (highlighting the Title III principles covering
audio surveillance that federal courts have borrowed in the absence of express
legislation on video surveillance). Unlike Torres where video surveillance was
necessary because the terrorists acted in silence, Biasucci does not explain why the
government needed to use video surveillance in addition to other forms of electronic
surveillance. Id. at 453.
122. 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987).
123. Id. at 249-50.
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the video camera on a utility pole overlooking a tall fence at the back
of the defendant's property." The Fifth Circuit rejected the
government's argument that the defendants could not have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their backyard because it could
be seen from a variety of different locations.'"' The court invoked
principles from Title III, believing, as the Torres and Biasucci courts
did, that doing so would safeguard the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights sufficiently. '26 The majority felt the warrant
satisfied the statutory requirements, and concluded that the Fourth
Amendment had been satisfied. 'V
In Cuevas-Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit adopted the standard from
Torres but applied it less strictly, concluding that the video
surveillance was not absolutely necessary but approving it anyway."
Neither Cuevas-Sanchez nor Biasucci appears to have balanced the
necessity of the video surveillance against its level of intrusiveness. 9
2. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant
requirement. If something illegal is in plain view, there is no need for
a warrant because law enforcement officials did not have to search to
find it. Thus an officer has the right to seize illegal property in plain
view without a warrant." Originally, the plain view exception
required that police discover the evidence inadvertently.' In Horton
v. California,'32 however, the Supreme Court eliminated the
inadvertence requirement for a plain view seizure."'
124. Id. at 250.
125. Id. at 250-51.
126. Id. at 251-52.
127. Id. at 252.
128. Troy, supra note 121, at 456. The crime under surveillance was not life
threatening and occurred in the back yard of Cuevas-Sanchez' home. The court
recognized that a camera was not necessary to obtain the information sought.
Nevertheless, the court still upheld the warrant.
129. Id. The courts did not appear to be balancing the type of crime involved with
the place to be searched, and so would appear to be relaxing the standards for video
surveillance warrants.
130. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). See also Jennifer M.
Granholm, Video Surveillance on Public Streets: The Constitutionality of Invisible
Citizen Searches, 64 U. DET. L. RaV. 687, 692 (1987).
131. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-71.
132. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
133. Id. at 137-42.
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Another exception to the warrant requirement is the open fields
doctrine.'"4 The doctrine suggests that if an item cannot be classified
as a person, house, paper, or effect, the item is not entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection against search or seizure.35  This is
particularly true where the owner has not taken reasonable
precautions to ensure privacy.'36 The open fields doctrine arises in
cases involving warrantless aerial surveillance by law enforcement
agencies.137
3. Information Privacy
Information privacy is based on an autonomist view of
individuals. Personal data is part of the "self."'" The autonomist
view construes the right to privacy as protecting the information that
comprises a person's "data image."'39  As society becomes more
information-based, the need for individuals to distribute their
personal information increases."4 An unwillingness to give personal
information to others effectively prevents an individual from fully
functioning in society. 4' As personal information becomes more
important and is accessible to a greater number of people and
institutions, the need to protect such private information intensifies.
Although the Fourth Amendment addresses the tension between
the interest against intrusion and surveillance technology, no
constitutional clause addresses the specific right to privacy. The
regulation of information privacy, however, still begins with the
134. Id.
135. Id. The Fourth Amendment specifically discusses "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"However reasonable a landowner's expectations of privacy may be, those
expectations cannot convert a field into a 'house' or an 'effect.'" Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984) (White, J., concurring). See also Granholm, supra
note 130, at 693.
136. Granholm, supra note 130, at 693.
137. Id.
138. Bercu, supra note 88, at 401. See also ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE
KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 326 (1995) ("A portrait of you ... will exist in
cyberspace. The profile could be so complete that it will be like having another self
living in a parallel dimension; it is a self you cannot see, but one that affects your life
just the same.").
139. Id.
140. Fred W. Weingarten, Communications Technology: New Challenges to
Privacy, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 735,741-42 (1988).
141. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPUTER-BASED NATIONAL
INFORMATION SYSTEMS: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 108 (1981).
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Constitution.'42 Because no right to privacy is enumerated in the
Constitution, there is disagreement over what the right entails.
Statutes that regulate information privacy generally regulate
governmental use of personal data more broadly and strictly than
private use of such data. 143
The Supreme Court has examined the issue of information
privacy only once. In Whalen v. Roe,'" the Court held that the State
of New York could maintain a database of individuals who legally
obtained narcotics by prescription.'45 The Court found that the
legitimate state interest in regulating prescription drugs outweighed
the individual's privacy right in the personal information contained n
the database.'46 In dicta, however, the Court explicitly recognized that
an information privacy interest exists.'
47
Just as the right to reproductive privacy established in Griswold
remained uncertain until subsequent decisions by the Court, the right
to information privacy similarly remains unclear.'" Scholars generally
agree that, at present, the right to privacy in personal information is
weak. However, as personal information begins to play a greater role
in individuals' daily lives and the interest in personal information
privacy increases, the need to develop this right will increase as well.
D. Federal Statutory Enactments
On the federal level, Congress has not yet enacted legislation to
protect individuals from the widespread use of video surveillance,
facial recognition, or other new surveillance technologies.'49 Courts,
however, use Title III5 and the Privacy Act of 1974 to prevent
abuses of these technologies.'
142. See Julia M. Fromholz, Foreign and International Law: The European Union
Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461,469 (2000).
143. Id.
144. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
145. Id. at 591.
146. Id. at 598-602.
147. Id. at 605 ("The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is
typically accompanied by a concomitant... duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures .... In some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the
Constitution....").
148. ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 138, at 141-42.
149. Burrows, supra note 10, at 1083. "Congress has never directly addressed the
use of video surveillance on public streets." Id.
150. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994).
151. See generally Troy, supra note 121, at 448-49 (discussing traditional Fourth
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Title III restricts aural surveillance (wire and phone taps) where
none of the parties to the conversation consented.15 It does not
specifically address or encompass video surveillance."3 Before law
enforcement can use audio surveillance (and video surveillance by
analogy), Title III requires: (1) probable cause, (2) particularity (type
of crime, location, type of communication, and identity of surveillance
subject), (3) necessity (must be able to show that other more
traditional and less intrusive forms of surveillance cannot succeed),
and (4) minimization (must minimize the interception of non-relevant
conversation and activity)."s In 1986, Congress amended Title III to
correspond with the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.'55
The Privacy Act of 1974156 restricts the collection, use, and
dissemination of personal information by federal agencies and allows
individuals the right to access and correct such information." The
Act also controls the matching of information from several
government databases, commonly referred to as "data creep."' s The
law prohibits federal employees from disclosing any data that could
incorporate an individual's biometric signature to any party not
entitled to receive that information.'59 Federal employees are not
prohibited from releasing the information to other federal agencies or
to federal or state law enforcement agencies."6
E. State Privacy Protections
States have the power to create rights for their citizens, beyond
those protected by the U.S. Constitution. 6' Proposals to regulate or
Amendment requirements).
152. Id. at 445.
153. Id. at 448.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (Supp. 1986).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c) (Supp. 1986). The good faith exception was
announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). If a law enforcement officer
has a good faith belief that a warrant is valid, then evidence found pursuant to the
warrant is not excludable. Id. at 919-20.
156. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
157. This statute prohibits disclosure of personal information "without the written
consent of an individual to whom the record pertains unless the disclosure is for the
purpose for which the data was collected." Petti, supra note 45, at 732.
158. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (Supp. 1995).
159. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7) (1994).
160. Id. The head of the federal agency or law enforcement agency must formally
request the portion of the record desired and describe the purpose for which it is
desired. Id.
161. Burrows, supra note 10, at 1113.
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terminate law enforcement's ability to use video surveillance may find
support in state privacy rights as expressed in state constitutions or
statutes. 62  Some states, including Oregon, Pennsylvania, Alaska,
Hawaii, and Montana, explicitly articulate an individual right to
privacy in their state constitutions."6 Many civil liberties and criminal
defense lawyers count on state courts, which are often more
protective of individual rights than federal courts, to check the use of
new surveillance technologies." 4
The California Constitution specifically includes privacy as an
inalienable right." In many of its rulings, the California Supreme
Court has indicated that the scope of the protection granted by the
state constitution's explicitly enumerated privacy right is at times
greater than the scope of the U.S. Constitution's unenumerated right
of privacy. 6  In the context of privacy claims by defendants in
criminal trials, however, the California Supreme Court has held that
the right to privacy guaranteed by article 1, section 1 of the California
Constitution is merely coextensive with the federal right guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment.67 With respect to surveillance in the
search and seizure context, the privacy protections of the California
Constitution currently apply only where the parties to the
conversation have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what is
said.'6' Thus, although the California Constitution's explicit
articulation of an individual right to privacy could allow courts to
check law enforcement's use of powerful new surveillance
technologies, it has yet to be used that way.69
162. Id. State courts must have adequate and independent grounds for decisions
resting on state constitutional fights and must make a plain statement that, in the
court's judgment, the case was decided on state constitutional law. Id. at 1112.
163. Id. at 1113-14. Montana employs a strict scrutiny test in cases involving
privacy rights. Id.
164. Hansen, supra note 17, at 48.
165. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1. ("All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy.")
166. See, e.g., Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 440 n.3 (Cal. 1980) (noting
that the federal right to privacy "appears to be narrower than what the voters
approved in 1972 when they added 'privacy' to the California Constitution").
167. People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1983).
168. People v. Estrada, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
169. See generally J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19
PEPP. L. REv. 327 (1992) (noting that the California Constitution explicitly declares
that state constitutional rights are independent of corresponding federal
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F. American Bar Association Proposed Standards
The American Bar Association (ABA) has proposed standards
with respect to "technologically assisted physical surveillance.""17
These standards expand on the uses of video surveillance by
permitting its use for the interception of private communications
(wiretapping)."' The standards support use of facial recognition
technology when "it is reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law
enforcement objective, approved by a politically accountable political
official, and presented to the public with an opportunity for
comment."' Where video surveillance is used for deterrence
purposes, the ABA believes the public must first be notified of the
proposed video camera and allowed to express its views." While
having no binding legal effect, the ABA's standards constitute
persuasive authority and encourage public debate over the use of
video surveillance.
G. Current Effect of U.S. Privacy Rights on Video Surveillance and
Facial Recognition Technology
Facial recognition technology is most likely to be used as part of
a law enforcement video surveillance system monitoring public areas
such as airport terminals, border entry points, and housing projects.
Currently, it is unlikely the Supreme Court would characterize public
video surveillance by law enforcement agencies as a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as the Court has said there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in public areas."
Under the Katz test, a court considers whether the individual
reasonably expects to be free of surveillance in the areas where he or
she is carrying out activities. 75 While in public, most people generally
expect to be observed by others, such as being monitored or
videotaped while in a convenience store or in the office building in
constitutional rights).
170. Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARv. J.L. & TEcH. 383,
388 (1997). The product of the ABA's Task Force on Technology and Law
Enforcement, these standards were adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates in
August, 1998. Ward, supra note 26, at S8.
171. Slobogin, supra note 170, at 440.
172. Hansen, supra note 17, at 48.
173. Ward, supra note 26, at S8.
174. Burrows, supra note 10, at 1090.
175. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351-52 (1967).
2002]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
which they work. On the other hand, most people expect to be free
from surveillance in the home.
Under the plain view doctrine,'76 information discovered through
the use of video surveillance and facial recognition technology would
generally not violate privacy rights. Discovery of illegal acts with the
technology is analogous to discovery of information in the plain view
of law enforcement officials. Particularly because of the elimination
of the inadvertence requirement, it is likely that video surveillance
and facial recognition technology could be validated under the plain
view doctrine.
Under the open fields doctrine,'77 the use of facial recognition
technology to extract a facial signature from a video image would be
considered far less intrusive than extraction of biological samples
from a person's body. The Supreme Court, however, generally
considers the gathering of individuals' physiological or biometric
information by the government as a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment."
Under the Torres test, courts consider the level of intrusiveness
of facial recognition technology and video surveillance.'79 Because
facial recognition technology is the least intrusive method available, it
is likely that a court would find that this technology passes the Torres
test."l
Whether a constitutional "right to privacy" will stymie efforts to
implement facial recognition technology and video surveillance
depends on the extent and uses of these surveillance systems.'' If
facial recognition technology or some other biometric identifier
becomes too pervasive, federal and state courts might fight to
invalidate the technology out of fear that the federal government was
trying to track every move of each citizen.' The social security
176. See supra pt. III(C)(2).
177. See supra pt. III(C)(3).
178. Petti, supra note 45, at 723.
179. See United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).
180. Id. at 883. While it is unknown whether the Supreme Court would consider
the use of facial recognition technology to gather biometric signatures as an
unreasonable invasion of privacy, the Court has allowed the government to violate a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy when it advances a legitimate government
interest
181. Petti, supra note 45, at 726. This presumably includes the corresponding
public perception and response to the program.
182. Id.
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number, however, is now used as a de facto national identification
device and no court has invalidated its use.18
IV. The Right to Privacy in the United Kingdom
A. History
Although the right to privacy originated in the United States, the
first data privacy legislation was passed in Europe in 197 0 ."4 The
European interest in personal privacy is rooted in recent history,
stemming largely from its experience in population control exercised
by Nazi Germany during World War IV85
The modem right to privacy is asserted in Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 6 Article 8, which
was incorporated into U.K. law by the Human Rights Act of 1998,
binds states to respect individual privacy. s1 Article 8, and now the
Human Rights Act of 1998, assert that interference with privacy is
permissible only when it is necessary and carried out in accordance
with the law." The Human Rights Act of 1998 voided the common
law approach, which had allowed the police to do whatever they
wanted as long as it was not prohibited by law.
In July 2000, the Data Protection Commissioner (DPC)
published the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), setting out for the
first time a comprehensive legal framework for the use of CCTV
systems. 9 The Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act 2000 also
became relevant to issues of privacy and surveillance."9
183. Id. at 727. The government does not yet have the ability to track every
individual's movements with his or her social security number. "Today, private
enterprises and universities along with the government use the social security number
as identification." Id.
184. Michael W. Heydrich, A Brave New World: Complying With the European
Union Directive on Personal Privacy Through the Power of Contract, 25 BROOK. J.
INT'LL. 407,417 (1999).
185. Id.
186. Orla Ward, Is Big Browser Watching You?, 150 NEw L.J. 1414 (2000).
187. Id.
188. Ed Cape, Regulating Police Surveillance, 150 NEW L.J. 452 (2000).
189. John Wadham, Remedies for Unlawful CCTV Surveillance - Part 1, 150 NEW
L.J. 1173 (2000).
190. Ward, supra note 186.
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B. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
The Human Rights Act of 1998 came into full effect on October
2, 2000. It incorporated into domestic U.K. law most of the rights
contained in the ECHR. 9' This included Article 8 of the ECHR.1
92
Article 8 states "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence,"' 93 and
allows interference with this right by the state only where it is
necessary for certain purposes."M In the context of the collection of
evidence in criminal matters, these purposes include the interests of
national security and public safety, and the prevention of disorder or
crime.'95 In accordance with the principles established in Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom,196 the law must prescribe any interference,
and the interference must have a legal basis which is accessible and
precise enough to enable people to know when interference is
allowed.19' In addition, the interference must be necessary and
proportionate in the context of criminal evidence. Relevant questions
include whether the method of surveillance is the least intrusive,
whether other methods have been tried and found ineffective, and
whether the offense is of sufficient gravity to justify surveillance and
the resulting breach of privacy. 98 A system of accountability must
exist, preferably independent of the police, to authorize and monitor
the use of surveillance."9 Where the use of surveillance aggrieves a
person, a means of determining whether privacy rights have been
violated and mechanisms to provide a remedy must exist.2"
191. Tas Voutourides, Privacy Protected by Interception Legalities - The Impact of
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 on the Surveillance of Employee
Communications in the Workplace, 97 L. Soc'Y GAZETTE 40 (2000).
192. Id.
193. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights].
194. Id. art. 8(2).
195. Id.
196. 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245 (1979).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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C. The Data Protection Act 1998
The DPA regulates the use of "personal data."' It went into
effect on March 1, 2000, implementing the European Community
Directive' on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and the free movement of such data (EC
Directive). 3
1. Definitions
The EC Directive is clear that "techniques used to capture,
transmit, manipulate, record, store or communicate sound and image
data relating to natural persons" are included in the DPA.2 ' The EC
Directive is realized in the DPA definitions. 5 The DPA defines
"personal data" as "data which relate to a living individual who can
be identified either from those data, or from those data and other
information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the
possession of, the data controller ... .."' This definition is not limited
to circumstances where a data controller can attribute a name to a
particular image.' The DPA definitions cover any image of an
individual's features from which that individual could be identified.2 3
The DPA defines "processing" of personal data extremely broadly,
covering all sorts of recording and holding of images (even if just for a
limited period of time or if no further reference is made to those
images) as well as real-time transmission of the images or any further
use or disclosure. 9
Based on the DPA definitions, it is clear that the DPA covers
video surveillance and the use of facial recognition technology.
Further, where the data is "sensitive," more stringent conditions
apply.210  Sensitive data includes information regarding the
commission or alleged commission of an offence.
CCTV surveillance is undertaken for various purposes, and the
201. Wadham, supra note 189.
202. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
203. Wadham, supra note 189.
204. Id.
205. Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29, § 1 (Eng.) [hereinafter DPA].
206. Id. § 1(1).
207. Wadham, supra note 189.
208. Id.
209. See DPA, supra note 205, § 1(1).
210. Wadham, supra note 189.
211. Id.
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legal framework differs according to those purposes.212 Broadly, these
purposes can be categorized as: (1) directed covert surveillance, (2)
intrusive covert surveillance, (3) other covert surveillance, and (4)
non-covert surveillance.1  The DPA covers all these purposes. 4 In
addition, the first two categories are subject to the specific provisions
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.21 ' Therefore, the only
form of CCTV surveillance that the statute regulates is when an




The DPA sets out eight principles with which data controllers
must comply.217 While all eight principles are binding,." this Note
discusses only those that are relevant to CCTV. The first principle is
fair and lawful processing. Fair and lawful processing requires
adherence to the conditions set out in the DPA. It also requires that
certain information be provided or made readily available to the
individual, including the identity of the data controller and the
general purpose for which the data is being processed. "  When
determining fairness, courts look to the method that the police used
to obtain the data."1 Processing is not fair if the individuals are
deceived or misled as to the purpose for which the data is collected
and processed.'m Posting appropriate signs might satisfy both
elements. Clearly, a posting is not possible for covert surveillance.
However, the DPA provides an exemption where the purpose of
surveillance is prevention and detection of crime or apprehension and
prosecution of offenders.' The requirement for lawful processing





216. DPA, supra note 205, § 36.
217. Wadham, supra note 189.
218. Id.
219. DPA, supra note 205, § 4(1), sched. 1, pt. I.
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into account. 24 For example, where the information is confidential,
the common law duty of confidentiality has to be complied with in
addition to the specific provisions of the DPA.
The second principle with which data controllers must comply is
that the data may be obtained only for one or more specified and
lawful purposes and may not be further processed in any manner
incompatible with that purpose.' This principle means a data
controller must be clear about the purpose(s) for which the images
are processed and, if disclosure is to be made to a third party, the data
controller must consider the purposes for which the third party might
process the data in order to ensure compatibility. 6
The third principle requires that data be adequate, relevant and
not excessive in relation to the purposes for which it is processed. '
For example, cameras installed for the purpose of recording acts of
vandalism in a parking lot should not overlook neighboring private
residences, and blurred images may be inadequate because they have
no evidential value.
The fifth and final principle relating to CCTV requires that data
not be held any longer than necessary for the purpose for which it is
processed.' It may therefore be necessary to destroy data, for
example, after all legal proceedings have terminated. 9
3. Rights of Data Subjects
The DPA accords data subjects particular rights.20 The DPA
allows a data subject the "right to be informed when the controller is
processing their personal data, the right to object to processing, and
the right to have the controller rectify incorrect personal data."' 3' The
DPA also gives the data subject the right to prevent processing for
direct marketing, and the right to require that no decision that
significantly affects the data subject be made solely by automated
means where it is to be used to evaluate matters relating to him (e.g.
224. Id.
225. DPA, supra note 205, § 4(1) of 2, sched. 1, pt. I.
226. Wadham, supra note 189.
227. DPA, supra note 205, § 4(1) of 2, sched. 1, pt. I.
228. DPA, supra note 205, § 4(1) of 2, sched. 2, pt. I.
229. Wadham, supra note 189.
230. Patrick J. Murray, The Adequacy Standard Under Directive 95/46/EC: Does
U.S. Data Protection Meet This Standard?, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 932, 962 (1998).
231. Id.
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performance at work).f2 Finally, the data subject has the right to
require rectification, blocking, and destruction or erasure of
inaccurate data by application to the court.
4. Exemptions and Remedies
Specific exemptions that may be relevant to CCTV include the
following purposes: processing for prevention or detection of crime;
apprehension or prosecution of offenders; safeguarding national
security; certain regulatory activities; journalism, literature or art; and
disclosures required by law or made in connection with legal
proceedings.l 3
Where a breach of the DPA occurs, the individual can either go
to the courts or make a claim to the DPC. If satisfied that a breach
has occurred, the DPC can serve an enforcement notice on the data
controller, requiring the person to refrain from processing or to
process only in a way that does not infringe on the individual's
rights."5 If the individual can prove actual damage, he or she can
receive compensation. 6 Failure to comply with a notice is punishable
by a fine. 7
Recently, the use of CCTV was challenged in the domestic courts
in R. v. Brentwood Borough Council, ex parte Peck." The case is now
pending before the European Court of Human Rights. 9 There is an
issue as to whether privacy applies at all to the recording of images
which are within public space, but this is assumed for the purposes of
the DPA and is clearly a matter of fact in any particular case.'l
D. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
The controversial Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
(RIP Act) entered Report Stage in the House of Lords on July 10,
232. Id.
233. Wadham, supra note 189.
234. John Wadham, Remedies for Unlawful CCTV Surveillance - Part 2, 150 NEW
L.J. 1236 (2000).
235. DPA, supra note 205, § 40.
236. Id. § 13.
237. Id. § 60.
238. 1998 E.M.L.R. 697 (Eng. C.A.).
239. Peck v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44647/98; Philip Leach, Keep Out: It's My
Life, TIMES (London), June 12,2001.
240. R. v. Broad. Complaints Comm. exparte BBC, 1994 E.M.L.R. 497 (Q.B.).
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2000 and received Royal Assent on July 28, 2000.241 The stated
purpose of the RIP Act is to ensure that investigatory powers are
used in accordance with human rights.242 To achieve this end, the RIP
Act sets out the purposes for which such powers may be used, which
authorities may use them, who may authorize use, what use may be
made of material gained, independent judicial oversight, and a means
of redress for the individual.243 The RIP Act includes "arrangements
for updating and expanding the law governing the interception of
communications, the acquisition of data relating to communications
and the regulation of surveillance activities" to ensure they are in
compliance with the European Union Telecommunications Data
Protection Directive and the ECHR. 4  It purports to close the
loophole in U.K. law unearthed in Halford v. United Kingdom.245 The
RIP Act extends the general prohibition on interception to private as
well as public telecommunications systems.246 It also regulates the
interception of e-mail and decryption of collected material. 47 The
RIP Act also statutorily authorizes the use of covert surveillance by
the security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and other
public authorities."
The RIP Act provides that any conduct carried out in accordance
with an authorization will be lawful (whether that conduct is in the
United Kingdom or abroad).2 49 In addition, if neither this Bill nor
existing legislation requires separate authorization, incidental conduct
will not be subject to civil liability'O
The RIP Act covers two types of covert surveillance: directed
surveillance and intrusive surveillance." I Directed surveillance is
surveillance undertaken in relation to a specific investigation or a
specific operation which is likely to result in the obtaining of private
241. Ward, supra note 186; Voutourides, supra note 191; see Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Bill 2000, cl. 26 (Eng.) [hereinafter RIP Act].
242. Wadham, supra note 234.
243. Id.
244. Voutourides, supra note 191.
245. Ward, supra note 186.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Wadham, supra note 234. Covert surveillance is surveillance carried out such
that the subject of the surveillance is unaware that it is taking place. RIP Act, supra
note 241, cl. 26(9).
249. RIP Act, supra note 241, cl. 27.
250. Wadham, supra note 234.
251. Id.
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information about a person and not done as an immediate response
to events or circumstances that would make it impracticable to seek
an authorization.' Authorization can be granted only where the
person authorizing the surveillance believes that it is (1) in the
interests of national security; (2) for the purposes of preventing or
detecting crime or preventing disorder; (3) in the interests of the
economic well-being of the United Kingdom; (4) in the interests of
public safety; (5) for the purpose of protecting public health; (6) for
the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other
imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government
department; or (7) for other purposes which may be specified by
order of the Secretary of State.53 Authorization can also be granted
where the authorized activity is proportionate to what it seeks to
achieve.' Only the Secretary of State has the authority to prohibit
certain conduct or impose additional requirements for authorization
on certain types of directed surveillance. 5
Intrusive surveillance is surveillance carried out in relation to
anything taking place on residential premises or in any private
vehicle. 6 Surveillance devices that only provide information about
the location of a vehicle, for example, are not covered. 57 Only the
Secretary of State and senior officers can authorize intrusive
surveillance, and such surveillance may be authorized only if it is "(1)
in the interests of national security, (2) for the purpose of preventing
or detecting serious crime, (3) in the interests of the economic well-
being of the U.K., or (4) where the authorized activity is
proportionate to what it seeks to achieve." ''5 The authorizing officer
then must determine whether the information could be obtained
through less intrusive means. 9
The government's stated intention in promoting the RIP Act is
to "put beyond doubt the legality, in human rights terms, of intrusive
surveillance of the kind addressed by the Act.''260 However, this
252. RIP Act, supra note 241, cl. 26(2).
253. Id. cl. 28(3).
254. Id. cl. 28(2)(b).
255. Wadharn, supra note 234.
256. RIP Act, supra note 241, cl. 26(3)(9).
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system of authorization is not mandatory.261 Failure to comply merely
results in official sanction.26
Fortunately, the DPA still applies in cases where no
authorization is sought or given, and where the surveillance does not
fall within the RIP Act.2 63 As already noted, the DPA implements the
EC Directive and the EC Directive refers specifically to Article 8 of
the ECHR. Scholars observe that the EC Directive expressly
requires member states to "protect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons, in particular their right to privacy, with
respect to the processing of personal data."26 Nevertheless, Article 8
of the ECHR should be considered an additional requirement, above
and beyond the DPA and the RIP Act's consideration of the "in
accordance with the law" prong of Article 8.265
Where surveillance is secret, it undeniably interferes with an
individual's right to private life.2 6 Under Article 8(2), however, the
legitimate uses of government surveillance include (1) national
security, (2) public safety, (3) the economic well-being of the country,
(4) prevention of disorder or crime, and (5) protection of the rights
and freedoms of others. 267 The more difficult issue will be deciding
whether in a particular case the surveillance was "necessary in a
democratic society."2" This will depend upon whether, on the facts of
the case, the means used are proportionate to the aim being
pursued.2 69 In terms of Article 8, this means that there must be a
pressing social need for the interference, not merely a good reason for
it." The aim is to achieve a fair balance between the general interests






266. Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1978). See also Friedl v.
Austria, 305-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1995).
267. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 193, art. 8(2).
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E. Current Effect of U.K. Privacy Law Video Surveillance and
Facial Recognition Technology
Facial recognition technology and video surveillance is legal in
the United Kingdom, and has in fact been extensively used there for
the past few years. The United Kingdom, years ahead of the United
States in dealing with public video surveillance and facial recognition
technology, is now addressing the effects of new technology on
privacy rights by enacting new laws regulating its use. These new U.K.
regulations can serve as an example from which the United States can
build upon and learn from in the near future.
V. Proposed Regulation: Learning from U.K. Regulations on
Video Surveillance and Facial Recognition Technology
In dealing with the impact of video surveillance and facial
recognition technology, the United States could learn from the
recently enacted U.K. regulations. The entire area of law pertaining
to privacy rights in the United States and its invasion by new
technology is inadequate. Rather than waiting for the courts to try to
catch up with the technology, the United States should follow the
United Kingdom's lead by enacting new regulations and laws dealing
with emerging technology.
A. Likelihood of New Laws Regulating Privacy Rights
The European approach to privacy rights, however, differs from
that of the United States, and these differences are likely to prevent
implementation of entirely new regulations in the United States.
European nations take an omnibus approach to individual rights and
give the state a proactive preventive role. 2 The European emphasis
is on the deterrence of harm, which is accomplished by instituting
control mechanisms necessary for oversight. 3
In contrast, the United States patches together provisions of the
U.S. Constitution, state constitutions, federal and state legislation,
and state common law to address the right to privacy. 4 It takes a
reactive approach by legislating in narrow specific areas where
problems have occurred. 75  This approach emphasizes use of
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remedies for damage that has already taken place and prevents future
harm via threat of legal action. 6
Therefore, because of this patchwork method of privacy
regulation, the United States may never have an over-arching privacy
statute. However, a clearer federal privacy protection policy is
necessary for the United States to provide adequate protections for
the right to privacy in the face of emerging technologies.'
B. Proposed Regulation
Proposed regulation could be incorporated on either a federal or
state level based on the Torres test.28 For the use of video
surveillance, the regulation should balance the necessity of the
surveillance against the level of intrusion to establish a clear rule for
what type of video surveillance is allowed. The proposed regulation
would recognize the benefits of decreased crime in areas that have
implemented video surveillance and use of facial recognition
software.
In the interests of promoting the use of technology to aid law
enforcement, surveillance in any place that is not a private dwelling or
other obviously private area, e.g. restrooms or changing rooms,
should be considered low intrusion when used for law enforcement
purposes. Expectations of privacy are generally lower in public
places. Therefore, surveillance in these areas would not chill human
behavior and interaction.79 Human behavior naturally adjusts merely
by being in public areas. However, in order to put the public on
notice, the government should post signs in areas where non-covert
video surveillance occurs.
The rule would permit all surveillance conducted by law
enforcement or government agencies for: (1) national security; (2)
public safety; (3) the economic well-being of the country; (4)
prevention of disorder or crime; or (5) protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. The rule would require all other surveillance
interests, including private individuals who wish to conduct video
surveillance in public, to apply to the appropriate government agency
and detail the necessity of surveillance versus the level of intrusion.
276. Id.
277. Fromholz, supra note 142, at 483.
278. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).
279. Christopher S. Milligan, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance,
and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 295,327 (1999).
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This rule would enable the use of video surveillance only when
necessary for the public good. For covert surveillance, the regulation
should be stricter. All covert surveillance would require filing and
authorization before being permitted.
Some commentators fear that the use of facial recognition
surveillance technology will lead to discriminatory targeting of certain
groups.2" In order to avoid discriminatory profiling, monitors would
have to follow a preset scanning pattern of the vicinity, thereby
eliminating any biased surveillance. Human intervention in the
surveillance would only be allowed in the case where a match was
made. When video surveillance is used in conjunction with facial
recognition technology, images collected that do not match the
criminals listed in a database must be discarded immediately. No
surveillance images would be retained unless a match was found.
Therefore, most people would not have to fear that a romantic
rendezvous in the park would be captured indefinitely on film.
Moreover, personal information, including biometric and
commercial information, should not be released to private
individuals. This compilation of data should be allowed for law
enforcement and related purposes only. Furthermore, a watchdog
agency other than the overcrowded courts should be set up to
monitor government collection and use of video surveillance data.
VL Conclusion
The use of video surveillance and facial recognition technology is
justified for law enforcement purposes when properly limited to use
only in public areas where there is little or no expectation of privacy.
Particularly in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
surveillance measures utilizing new technologies will increase. The
current law in the United States draws a fuzzy line between valid and
illegal surveillance and fails to address the privacy concerns arising
from the use of new technologies. Proper regulation that balances the
right to privacy and the need for efficient law enforcement would
allow individuals' personal autonomy to thrive in a much safer
environment.
The United States is still searching for answers to the issues
arising from the use of new technologies; until the United States
enacts comprehensive legislation, it will continue to merely react to
280. Id. at 328.
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technological invasions of privacy rights or fail to implement new
technologies altogether.

